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Punishment. Special Circumstances.
Carjacking. Murder of Juror.
Legislative Initiative Amendment.
Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General
PUNISHMENT. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
CARJACKING. MURDER OF JUROR.
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE AMENDMENT.

• Adds murder during a caIjacking, murder resulting from a caIjacking kidnap and the intentional
murder of a juror in retaliation for, or prevention of, the performance of the juror's official duties
to the existing list of special circumstances for first-degree murder for which the death penalty or
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is authorized.
• Joined to Proposition 196 (Chapter 478, Statutes of 1995). If both measures pass, murder by
intentional discharge of firearm at persons from a motor vehicle is also added to the list of special
circumstances.

Summary of Legislative Analyst's
Estimate of Net State and Local Government Fiscal Impact:
• Probably minor additional state costs.

Final Votes Cast by the Legislature on SB 32 (Proposition 195)
Assembly: Ayes 59
Noes 7
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Senate: Ayes 28
Noes 2

P~

Analysis by the Legislative Analyst
Background
However, the law does not provide such a penalty in the
case
of the first-degree murder of a juror.
First-degree murder is generally defined in state law
as murder which is plamied in advance, or which takes
place during certain other crimes, including robbery, Proposal
This measure adds first-degree murder during either a
kidnapping, rape, or arson. It is generally punishable by
a sentence of 25-years-to-life imprisonment with the carjacking or a carjacking-kidnap to the list of special
possibility of release from prison on parole. However, a circumstances punishable by the death penalty or life
conviction for first-degree murder results in a more imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This
severe sentence of death or life imprisonment without the measure also specifies that the first-degree murder of a
possibility of parole if the prosecutor charges and the juror-either in retaliation for performing his or her
court finds that one or more "special circumstances" official actions or to prevent the juror from carrying out
specified in state law apply to the crime.
his or her official duties-is a special circumstance.
Currently, a first-degree murder resulting from a
"carjacking"-taking a vehicle against the will of a driver Fiscal Effect
or passenger by force or fear of force-is not such a
Because this measure increases the number of crimes
special circumstance. However, state law specifies that for which the special circumstances for first-degree
carjackers can also be charged with robbery, which is a murder applies, it would result in longer prison terms for
special circumstance crime. Consequently, under current some offenders, thereby increasing state costs. However,
law, a person convicted of first-degree murder during the
state
law
already
permits
carjackers
or
commission of a carjacking and additionally convicted of
carjack-kidnappers who commit first-degree murder to
robbery could be sentenced to death or life imprisonment
be charged with robbery or kidnapping, thereby
without the possibility of parole.
Similarly, a first-degree murder resulting from the subjecting them to the harsher penalties for special
kidnapping of an individual during a carjacking is not circumstance crimes. Thus, the changes in the law made
considered a special circumstance. Such offenders could by this measure explicitly listing those two crimes as
be charged, as the law allows, with kidnapping as a special circumstances are likely to result in minor
special circumstance crime resulting in a sentence of additional incarceration costs.
The provision of this measure designating the
death or life imprisonment without the possibility of
first-degree murder of a juror as a special circumstance
parole.
Finally, state law provides that the first-degree murder crime is likely to have little fiscal effect because such
of a judge, prosecutor, or certain other public officials is a crimes occur infrequently.
In summary, we estimate that the measure would
special circumstance punishable by a sentence of death
or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. probably result in minor additional state costs.

For the text of Proposition 195 see page 56
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Punishment. Special Circumstances.
Carjacking. Murder of Juror.
Legislative Initiative Amendment.
Argument in Favor of Proposition 195

Proposition 195 updates California's death penalty law.
In order to impose the death penalty or a sentence of life
without possibility of parole, a defendant must be found
guilty of first-degree murder and a special circumstance.
First-degree murder includes various types of felony
murder. Under the first-degree felony murder rule, when
a criminal participant kills a non-participant during a
robbery, carjacking, sexual assault crime, kidnapping or
other listed felony, all criminal participants are guilty of
first-degree murder.
The list of special circumstances includes murders for
financial gain, the victim was a law enforcement officer
or firefighter, retaliatory murders of witnesses,
prosecutors, or judges; and with two exceptions, all
first-degree felony murders.
The two categories of first-degree felony murders
which are not currently special circumstances are
carjacking and kidnapping-carjacking first-degree felony
murders. All other first-degree felony murders are also
special circumstances. Proposition 195 would make the
law of first-degree felony murder conform with the law of
special circumstances by adding these two categories to
the list of special circumstances.

As noted above, the current death penalty law covers
retaliatory murders of witnesses, prosecutors, and
judges, but does not include a retaliatory murder of a
juror as a special circumstance murder. Murdering a
juror because of his or her official actions is an equal
outrage and should be treated as such. Proposition 195
adds retaliatory first-degree murders of jurors to the
special circumstance list.
Proposition 195 is supported by Governor Wilson, the
California District Attorneys Association, the California
Peace Officers Association, the California State Sheriffs
Association, the California Correctional Peace Officers
Association, and the Doris Tate Crime Victims Bureau.
Vote Yes on Proposition 195!
STEVE PEACE
Senator, 40th District
PETER FRUSETIA
Assemblyman, 28th District
MICHAEL BRADBURY
District Attorney of Ventura County

Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 195
The death penalty has failed whenever and wherever it
has been tried. Enactment of Proposition 195 would
extend this failed policy, draining resources needed for
our children's education and for improvement of human
life. As voters, we have moral obligations to insist on
more effective policies to safeguard the limited public
resources needed to enhance our communities. Do not
extend use of the death penalty, even in appearance.
For too long, societies have experimented with death as
an outlet for vengeance, or as a shortcut solution to
difficult social problems. The experiment has failed, and
our communities have suffered. The very existence of
Proposition 195 attests to this.
History shows that the threat of death, when used as a
policy instrument inevitably erodes our collective vision
of the dignity of the human person. The death penalty
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undermines the value of human life on which democracy
rests, and tends to increase those same violent attitudes
and actions that the policy seeks to prevent.
We must use methods of preventing and penalizing
violent crime which do not promote the attitudes
underlying the wanton carjackings we abhor. Our
policies should instead promote awareness that human
life is a priceless gift endowed with inalienable value and
dignity.
RABBILEONARDI.BEE~

Los Angeles, CA
JEANETIE G.ARNQUIST
Director of Human Concerns
Roman' Catholic Diocese of San Bernardino
SAM REESE SHEPPARD
Director, Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation

Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency.
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Carjacking. Murder of Juror.
Legislative Initiative Amendment.
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Argument Against Proposition 195
A NO Vote on Proposition 195 will improve public
safety by re-focusing legislative attention on effective
ways to actually prevent violence.
Chiefs of police and law enforcement officers across the
country publicly acknowledge that the death penalty
does virtually nothing to prevent murder. In fact,
attention to the death penalty diverts law enforcement
resources from truly effective measures to reduce
violence and make communities safer. The best steps to
reduce crimes of all kinds include more neighborhood
watch programs, improved police training, effective
community policing, tough programs to reduce drug and
alcohol abuse, early juvenile offender intervention
programs, weapons control efforts, speedier trials,
domestic violence programs, and better funded probation
and parole services.
The death penalty already diverts too many dollars
from more worthy activities, and takes too much valuable
time of police and courts. Because some 50 capital cases
are investigated and prosecuted to effect a single
execution, millions of dollars must be spent and countless
hours of court time must be consumed to bring about
infrequent executions many years after the crime.
\lthough the death penalty may fascinate the media and

the public, the high cost of any extension of it cannot be
justified.
Too much attention to the extreme punishment
distracts policy makers and the public from the more
critical daily task of preventing violence. It also burdens
courts with lengthy death penalty trials and years of
appeals. From the perspective of those who see crime up
close on a daily basis, other priorities are more deserving
of public attention and support. The sooner we order
crime prevention priorities toward solutions with proven
records of effectiveness, the sooner we will be able to
make a serious dent in California's problems of violence.
Knowledgeable prosecutors and attorneys have pointed
out that this proposal would not add anything of
substance to the law. It is nothing more than a cosmetic
change. Let it be known that you want more effective
attention to the problem of violence by voting NO on
Proposition 195.
SENATOR MILTON MARKS
Chair, Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure
RIGHT REVEREND JERRY A. LAMB
Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Northern California
MIKE FARRELL
President, M, J & E Productions, Inc.

Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 195
The opponents of Proposition 195 fail to make any
valid argument against the merits of this necessary
change to California's Death Penalty Law.
Instead, the opponents who are clearly philosophically
opposed to the death penalty engage in a typical attack
on the utility and wisdom of the death penalty.
In truth, the death penalty is a deterrent. Those who
are executed never kill again. Moreover, society rightly
expects that those who commit the ·most aggravated
murders may, after careful procedures are followed,
forfeit their own lives for their heinous crimes.
On three separate occasions in the last 25 years,
California voters have overwhelmingly voted to support
the death penalty. The opponents of 195 choose to ignore
this mandate by making a misleading argument that is
simply untrue.
Proposition 195 simply updates the death penalty law
by adding "carjacking" and "kidnapping-carjacking"
first-degree felony murders to a list of special
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circumstances that make a criminal eligible for the death
penalty.
Also, while the current death penalty law covers
retaliatory murders of witnesses, prosecutors, and
judges, it does not include a retaliatory first-degree
murder of a juror. PropositioI1 195 therefore adds this
terrible crime to the special circumstance list.
Contrary to the arguments of the opposition, the death
penalty is supported by cops, prosecutors, and crime
victims. That is why these same groups overwhelmingly
support 195.
The bottom line is that the opposition has no merit.
Vote Yes on 195!
SUSAN A. DAVIS
Assemblywoman, 76th District
JIM MORRISSEY
Assemblyman, 69th District
MICHAEL FERGUSON
District Attorney of Nevada County

Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency.
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for investment earnings, order the payment of those earnings to comply with any
rebate requirement applicable under federal law, and may otherwise direct the use
and investment of those proceeds so as to maintain the tax-exempt status of those
bonds and to obtain any other advantage under federal law on behalf of the funds
of this state.

8879.17. The Director of Transportation shall report annually to the Governor
and the Legislature regarding the funds available for seismic retrofit projects and
the expenditure of bond proceeds.

Proposition 193: Text of Proposed Law
This amendment proposed by Assembly Constitutional Amendment 17
(Statutes of 1994, Resolution Chapter 110) expressly amends the Constitution by
amending a section thereof; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be deleted
are printed in eh iiteollt ty pe and new provisions proposed to be added are printed
in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SUBDIVISION (h) OF
SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE XIII A
(h) (1) For purposes of subdivision (a), the terms "purchased" and "change of in
ownership" shall not include the purchase or transfer of the principal residence of
the transferor in the case of a purchase or transfer between parents and their
children, as defined by the Legislature, and the purchase or transfer of the first
$1,000,000 of the full cash value of all other real property between parents and
their children, as defined by the Legislature. This subdivision shall apply to both
voluntary transfers and transfers resulting from a court order or judicial decree.
(2) (A) Subject to subparagraph (B), commencing with purchases or transfers
that occur on or after the date upon which the measure adding this paragraph

becomes effective, the exclusion established by paragraph (1) also applies to a
purchase or transfer of real property between grandparents and their grandchild
or grandchildren, as defined by the Legislature, that otherwise qualifies under
paragraph (1), if all of the parents of that grandchild or those grandchildren, who
qualify as the children of the grandparents, are deceased as of the date of the
purchase or transfer.
(B) A purchase or transfer of a principal residence shall not be excluded
pursuant to subparagraph (A) if the transferee grandchild or grandchildren also
received a principal residence, or interest therein, through another purchase or
transfer that was excludable pursuant to paragraph (1). The full cash value of any
real property, other than a principal residence, that was transferred to the
grandchild or grandchildren pursuant to a purchase or transfer that was
excludable Jlursuant to paragraph (1), and the full cash value of a principal
residence that fails to qualify for exclusion as a result of the preceding sentence,
shall be included in applying, for purposes of subparagraph (A), the one million
dollar ($1,000,000) full cash value limit specified in paragraph (1).

Proposition 194: Text of Proposed Law
This law proposed by Senate Bill 103 (Statutes of 1995, Chapter 440) is
submitted to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 10
of the Constitution.
This proposed law adds a section to the Penal Code; therefore, new provisions
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. Section 2717.9 is added to the Penal Code, to read:
2717.9. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a prisoner who
participates in a joint venture program is ineligible for unemployment benefits
upon his or her release from prison based upon participation in that program.

Proposition 195: Text of Proposed Law
This law proposed by Senate Bill 32 (Statutes of 1995, Chapter 477) is
submitted to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 10
of the Constitution.
This proposed law amends a section of the Penal Code; therefore, existing
provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in etl ikeollt ty pe and new provisions
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the
first degree shall be death or eOlmnement imprisonment in the state prison for a
term-of life without the possibility of parole in any eaee in which if one or more of
the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4, to be
true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
(2) The defendant was ple~iollely convicted previously of murder in the first
degree or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed
in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as
first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second
degree.
(3) The defendant Me, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than
one offense of murder in the first or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or
her act or acts would create a great risk of death to a human being one or more
human beings.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest Ot to pel feet, 01 attempt, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an
escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or
eatffle caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death
to a human being one or more human beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3,
830.31,830.32,830.33,830.34,830.35,830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10,
830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or
her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer, as defined in
the abo, e enllmel ated above-enumerated sections of the Penal Oode , or a former
peace officer under any of sneh those sections, and was intentiollally killed in
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.

56

(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, who, wt
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intention<.
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcement
officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of
his or her official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1, who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the
purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding,
and the killing was not committed during the commission, or attempted
commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a
witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her
testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph,
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a former prosecutor
or assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor's office in this l!tate or any
other state, or of a federal prosecutor's office, and the murder was intentionally
carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's
official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local,
state, or federal system in the State of Oalifm nia, 01 in this or any other state of
the United Statee, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation
for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former official of the
federal government, or of a any local or state government of Oalifol hia, 01 of any
loealol state government of aIry otheI etate in the United Statee this or any other
state, and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent
the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity. As ttti!ized used in this section, the phrase eepeeiaHy
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depla,ity
depravity" means a conscienceless, or pitiless crime which that is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, co
religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was
an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate
flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:
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(i)
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.

W

(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207 or, 209, or 209.5 .

fui1

(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.

,m

(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.

M

(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child under
the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.

m7

(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.

triB

(0) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.

mii1

(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.

fud

'

(l) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.

(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent; who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent; engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law 'enforcement
officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of
his or her official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1, who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a, witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the
purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding,
and the killing was not committed during the commission; or attempted
commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a
witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her
testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this. paragraph,
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a former prosecutor
or assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor's office in this lIt:tte or any
other state, or of a federal prosecutor's office, and the ,murder was intentionally
carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's
official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local,
state, or federal system in the State of Califm nia, III in this or any other state ttf
the United States, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation
for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former official of the
federal government, or of a any local or state government of Califolnia, Ol of any
loealol state govelnment of any othel state in the United States this or any other
state, and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent
the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous,atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity. As tttihzed used in this section, the phrase espeeiaJly
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional deplavity
depravity" means a consaienceless ; or pitiless crime whieh that is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his'or her race, color,
religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was
an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate
flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:

.
(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(L) Carjacking, as defined in S~ction 215.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction oftorture.
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of
poison.
(20) The. victim was a juror in any court of record in the local, state, or federal
system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried oUf in
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a
special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom sneh the
special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need riot
have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is
the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the
state prison for ~ life without the possibility of parole.
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the
commission of murder in the first degree shall 8ttffer be punished by death or
eonfinement imprisonment in the state prison for a telm of life without the
possibility of parole , in any ease in IIhieh if one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) of this seetion has been found to be
true under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who,
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets,
'msels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a
ony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a); which fel:tmy results in
(i)
Lne death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.
degree therefor, shall suffer be punished by death or eonfinement imprisonment in
the state prison for life without the possibility' of parole , in any eMe ill whieh if a
W
(BJ Kidnapping in violation of Section 207 or, 209, or Z09.5 .
special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) oHhi:s
seeiimt has been found to be true under Section 190.4.
fui1
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1,
is&.£; 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.
tm
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
SEC. 2. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the
M
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child under
first degree shall be death or eonfinement imprisonment in the state prison for a
term-6f life without the possibility of parole in any ease in whieh if one or more of the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.
the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4; to be
m7
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
triB
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.
(2) The defendant was pleviotlsly convicted previously of murder in the first
degree or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed
mii1
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.
in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as
first or second degree murder! shall be deemed niurder in the first or· second
fud
(l) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219,
degree.
. '
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.
(3) The defendant has', in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than
(~) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
one offense of murder in the first or second degree:
(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(4) The murder was committe by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.
explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or
poison.
her act or acts would create a great risk of death to a "tlman being one or more
(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local, state, or federal
human beings.
system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried out in
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
lawful arrest 01 to pelfect, III attempt, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an
(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a
escape from lawful custody.
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor ,
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or
vehicle" means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.
~ caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a
should have known, that his or her act .or acts would create a great risk of death
special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom sneh-the
to a htllnltll being one or more human beings.
,
special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need not
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3,
have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is
830.31,830.32,830.33,830.34,830:35,830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10,
the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the
'<30.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or
state prison for a-term--ttf life without the possibility pf parole.
r duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets,
,ould have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer, as defined in
commission of murder ill the first degree shall 8ttffer be punished by death or
the <'tho ve entlmel ated above-enumerated sections of the Penal Code, or a former
e!lllfinement imprisonment in the state prison for a telm of life without the.
peace officer under any of such those sections, and was intentionally killed in
possibility of parole, in any ease in whieh if one or more of the special
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.

a
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circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) ofthis seetion has been found to be
true under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who,
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a
felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivisIon (a) ; which felony results in
the death ·of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of mu~der in the first
degree therefor, shall sttft'er be punished by death or confinement imprisonment in
the state prison for life without the possibility of parole , in 1Ill)' cll8e in "hich if a
special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) oHhis
section has been found to be true under Section 190.4.

The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1,
TOO:£;.190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.
SEC. 3. This act affects !In initiative statute and shall become effective only
when submitted to and approved by the voters pursuant to subdivision (c) of·
Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution.
SEC. 4. Section 2 of this bill incorporates amendments to Section 190.2 off
Penal Code proposed by both this bill andSB 9. It shall only become operative
(1) both this bill and SB 9 are submitted to and approved by the voters pursuant
to subdivision (c) of Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution and
become effective on the same date, (2) each bill amends Section 190.2 of the Penal
Code, and (3) this bill receives more affirmative votes from the voters than SB 9,
in which case Section 1 of this bill shall not become operative.

Proposition 196: Text of Proposed Law
This law proposed by Senate Bill 9 (Statutes of 1995, Chapter 478) is submitted
to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 10 of the
Constitution.
This proposed law amends a section of the Penal Code; therefore, existing
provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in stIikeout type and new provisions
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found ~ilty of murder in the
first degree shltH-be is death or confinement imprisonment In the state prison for a
term-of-life without the possibility of parole in all)' cIIse in which if one or more of
the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4 ; to be
true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
(2) The defendant was ple~iousl, convicted previously of murder in the first
degree or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed
in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as
first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second
degree.
.
(3) The defendant has been convicted in this proceeding been conneted of more
than one offense cf murder in the first or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or
her act or acts would create a great risk of death to a human being or human
beings.
.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or to perfect, or attempt to perfect, an escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or
came caused to be mailed. or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death
to a human being or human beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3,
830.31,830.32,830.33,830.34,830.35,830.36,830.37, 83D.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10,
830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or
her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that .the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was.a peace officer, as defined in
the abo.e enunlelated above-enumerated sections ofthe Penal Code, or a former
peace officer under any of such those sections, and was intentionally killed in
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent -; engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcemint
officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of
his or her official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, <IS defined in Section 245.1, who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the
purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding,
and the killing was not committed during the commission, or attempted
commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a
witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her
testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph,
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, or a former prosecutor
or a former assistant prosecutor 01 118sistant pi osecutol , of any local or state
prosecutor's office in this state or any other state, or a of any federal prosecutor's
office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to
prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local,
state, or federal system in the State of Calif01 nia, 01 in this or any other state of
the United States, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation
for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
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(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official, or a forme~ elected or
former appointed official, of the federal government, of a local or state
government of Clllifoinill this state, or of any local or state government of any
other state in of the United States, and the kiHing murder was intentionally
carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's
official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity. As utilized in this section, the phrase especilll!, "eseecially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depIII'tt, depravity means
a conscienceless., or pitiless crime which that is unnecessarily torturous to the
victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color,
religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17)' The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was
an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate
flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:

ffi
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.

fiB

.

(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207 or 209.
(iii7
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.

6v1
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
M
.
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child und
the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.

M?

(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
fW1
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.

\Tiii1

(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.

6x1

(l) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.

(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.
(19) The defennant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of
poison.
(20) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside
the vehicle with the'intent to inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor
vehicle" means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.

(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a
special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom such the
special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need not
have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is
the basis of the special circumstance in order to Sttffer be punished by death or
confinenlent imprisonment in the state prison for II telm of life without the
possibility of parole.
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the
commission of murder in the first degree shall StHfer be punished by death or
confinement imprisonment in the state prison for a telm of life without the
possibility of parole, in 1Ill)' cIIse in which if one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) of this section has been found to be
true under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who,
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a
felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a), which felony results in the
death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first
degree therefor, shall strlfer be punished by death or eonfinement imprisonment ,the state prison for life without the possibility of parole , in an, case in whieh ij
special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) of-thto
section has been found to be true under Section 190.4.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1,
TOO:£; 190.3, 19D.4, and 190.5.
SEC. 2. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
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